China Deepens Military Ties with Southeast Asian Neighbors

China’s Foreign Minister Wang Yi hosted his counterparts from Laos, Cambodia, Vietnam, Thailand, and Myanmar in Beijing in early November 2026. During the meeting, the six nations agreed to pursue closer economic and security cooperation. This diplomatic gathering highlights a broader trend of Beijing’s increasing influence in Southeast Asia, which now extends beyond trade and infrastructure into the realm of military partnership.

A significant development in this trend occurred at the end of September when China and Laos opened a joint military support and training center north of Vientiane. According to Chinese officials, Laotian Air Force pilots will initially be trained at the Ban Keun airfield. This follows earlier moves in 2025 when China expanded its presence at Cambodia’s Ream naval base on the Gulf of Thailand. While Japanese and Vietnamese vessels can visit the port, they dock at a separate southern quay, leaving unclear whether other navies enjoy the same access conditions as the Chinese.

Marco Bünte, a professor of Asian politics at the University of Erlangen Nuremberg, noted that it remains to be seen how the new facility in Laos will alter China’s military access to the region. He observed that Laos and Cambodia have long been close military partners of Beijing, viewing the new center as another step in deepening that relationship. If this trajectory continues, Bünte explained, China would gain strategic depth in mainland Southeast Asia and improved military access to the South China Sea.

Johann Fuhrmann, head of the Konrad Adenauer Foundation’s Beijing office, advised distinguishing between the training of Laotian pilots and any potential future use of the facilities by Chinese forces. He told DW that China gains influence by co-designing the training and operation of such facilities over several years, rather than through immediate deployment.

Despite the focus on training, observers warn against underestimating China’s positioning. Bünte stated that Beijing is expanding its military operational capabilities, though he stopped short of calling it military hegemony. Data from the aviation media outlet FlightGlobal indicates that four K-8 jet trainer and light attack aircraft are in service in Laos. Additionally, satellite images analyzed by Reuters in early October showed eight K-8s at the Ban Keun base, although this does not confirm permanent stationing.

Fuhrmann cautioned against jumping to conclusions, noting that the concept of a Chinese air corridor remains a future scenario rather than a proven fact. He pointed out that the runway at Ban Keun is only 2,000 meters long, which is too short for large Chinese bombers that typically require 3,000 meters of runway. The crucial question, he argued, is what specific rights China will be granted regarding the use of these facilities during times of crisis.

Regional reactions vary. Countries like Laos, Cambodia, and Myanmar are already considered closer to China, while other Southeast Asian nations are hedging their bets. These states aim to expand relations with Beijing without severing ties with the United States or other Western economic partners. Bünte described this approach as pragmatic, with smaller Asian nations trying to keep as many options open as possible.

Vietnam and the Philippines are watching these developments closely due to their territorial disputes with China in the South China Sea. Vietnam, which has historical ties to Laos, declared in early November that military cooperation must serve peace and stability, referencing the ASEAN Treaty of Amity and Cooperation. Although China is not an ASEAN member, Beijing has stated its activities are not directed against any third parties.

Bünte added that these are currently individual steps and it is too early to determine if they will lead to a broader military alliance. Fuhrmann suggested that Western nations should help strengthen the smaller countries in the region by taking their interests seriously. He emphasized that a counterweight to Chinese influence can only be achieved through tangible contributions, rather than through warnings or lectures from Europe.